Internal ATO procedure regarding how to grant compromised taxpayers access to online services for individuals

Written by Claude Haiku 5.5 from the extracted text on 14 Oct 2026. It can miss or misread redacted and scanned pages. Check the source before relying on it.

This FOI release comprises two extracts from the ATO's internal procedure guidance (intranet-style pages) on managing security measures and Confirmed Compromised Accounting Treatments (CCATs) for taxpayers at increased risk of unauthorised access to Online services for individuals. The first page sets out a call-handling procedure for registered tax agents: agents may access pre-fill information from 2008–09 onwards without requesting that security measures be temporarily end-dated, while pre-2008–09 requests follow a different path. Agents lodging returns or activity statements are not restricted by the security measure. The second page explains that CCATs may be temporarily end-dated, re-applied or cancelled where they block lodgement, activity statement previews, account access, myGov linking or ABN applications. Many passages are redacted (s 47E(d), s 22), so the specific risk criteria, operational thresholds and any volumes or outcomes are not visible.