…my internal review request relates only to the decision-making related to the first four pages of the document bundle that was released to me. Even more narrowly, I make clear I seek a review of…

…my internal review request relates only to the decision-making related to the first four pages of the document bundle that was released to me. Even more narrowly, I make clear I seek a review of the S33(a)(iii)-related redactions made to these first four pages. (I am NOT challenging the s22(1)(a)(ii) redactions relating to protecting the privacy of individuals.) The redactions of those first four pages are extensive. They were made by the first decision maker on the basis that disclosure “would be reasonably likely to cause damage to Australia’s foreign relationships”. I ask that the internal review consider whether the redactions have been too extensive to legitimately, in all cases, be justified by S33(a)(iii). I acknowledge that any portions relaying, for example, material communicated in confidence by a foreign government or by an international organisation would could reasonably be seen to damage international relations, but I argue care should be taken to ensure this is not interpreted so broadly as to also redact portions of the document that merely outline factual material or simply summarise publicly available information. The OAIC’s guidance on exemptions points out: “The mere risk, allegation, possibility, or chance of prejudice does not qualify as a reasonable expectation. There must, based on reasonable grounds, be at least a real, significant or material possibility of prejudice.” For context, the wording of this FOI application was tightly modelled off my previous FOI to DFAT in June last year (LEX 12581) which also sought advice regarding progress in US-Iran nuclear negotiations. In that earlier case, the released documents included an email from Australia’s Ambassador for Arms Control and Counter-Proliferation dated 14 June 2025 reporting the latest developments at the IAEA, including that the IAEA resolution had found Iran non-compliant with its NPT obligations but had “deferred reporting Iran’s non-compliance to the Security Council, giving Iran a final opportunity to cooperate with the IAEA” and had "also stressed support for a diplomatic solution, including the US-Iran talks". I question why DFAT's factual updates on the Iran nuclear issues as of 27 February 2026 should be almost entirely redacted, unlike the different approach taken last year. Potential political embarrassment should not be relevant